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DNA "PROFILES" - THE PROBLEMS
OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER*
Since its introduction in September of 1984, "DNA
Fingerprinting"' has been heralded as "the single greatest advance in the
'search for truth', and the goal of convicting the guilty and acquitting the
innocent, since the advent of cross-examination"2 and denigrated as
"nothing less than scientific fraud. 3 The inherent controversy lies in the
struggle between a technique that is scientifically acceptable in a clinical
and diagnostic arena, yet is largely disputed when transferred to a forensic
* This Note would not have been possible without the Memorandum in Opposition
to the Introduction of DNA Evidence written for the defendant in People v. Castro by
Professor Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, Esq. Their tireless efforts mounted a
successful investigation into the alleged flawlessness of DNA profiles by exposing grave
problems in the scientific community's method of peer review and more importantly with
DNA profiling itself. Professor Scheck teaches at Cardozo School of Law and is a
member of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' DNA Task Force.
Peter Neufeld, Esq., is an Adjunct Professor at Fordham School of Law and was co-
counsel for the defendant in People v. Castro.
1. As termed by University of Leicester, England, geneticist Alec Jeffreys whose
rights to the technique were bought by ICI, the parent company of Cellmark Diagnostics
whose laboratory can test 250 blood samples a week by such a method. Connor, Genetic
Fingerprinting Goes on Sale, NEW SCIENTIST, July 23, 1987, at 30. This Note
elect[s] not to use the descriptive phrase "DNA
fingerprinting" because (1) it tends to trivialize
the intricacies of the processes by which
information for DNA comparisons is obtained
(when compared to the process of fingerprinting)
and (2) the word fingerprinting tends to suggest
erroneously that DNA testing of the type
involved in this case will identify conclusively,
like real fingerprinting, the one person in the
world who could have left the identifying
evidence at the crime scene.
Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, _, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 n.2 (1991).
2. Address by Harlan Levy, N.Y. County Lawyers Association (Oct. 18, 1989)
(quoting People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 308, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1988)).
3. Memorandum in Opposition to the Introduction of DNA Evidence at 38, People
v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (No. 1508/87)
[hereinafter Memorandum] (emphasis in original).
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setting.4 This Note will examine the controversy of "technology transfer"
by presenting some of the major areas of dispute and concern, while
leading to the conclusion that, for the time being, DNA Profiles must be
given less probative weight in court.' "They will have to be treated not
like 'fingerprints,' but more like eyewitness testimony that both the rapist
and the defendant were wearing an orange coat on the night of the
crime. "6
I. INTRODUCTION
The varying treatment of DNA Profiles as forensic evidence stems
from the revolutionary potential for its use in a variety of legal fields.
Proponents7 have expounded many uses for DNA Profiles beyond the
familiar paternity, homicide, and sexual assault applications, including hit
and run, body identification,' immigration (when an individual claims
blood relation),9 and other various non-legal applications.'" It has
already been admitted in more than 100 cases in 27 states and may
eventually lead to paternity trials being done away with altogether."
4. See generally Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986. "This
fascinating and novel issue has been dealt with in criminal proceedings on the trial level
in this State but as no appellate court in this State has yet ruled on the admissibility of
said procedures . . . ." Id. (citations omitted).
5. Thompson, Science and Society: Misprint, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 1989, at 14.
6. Id.
7. The three foremost proponents in the rapidly expanding field of DNA Typing
have been Lifecodes Corporation, Background Information, DNA-PRINT IDENTIFICATION
TEST (Saw Mill River Road, Valhalla, N.Y. 10595; postmarked Oct. 19, 1989)
[hereinafter Lifecodes.; Cellmark Diagnostics, DNA FINGERPRINTING AND DNA
PROFILING (20271 Goldenrod Lane, Germantown, Md. 20874; postmarked Oct. 17,
1989) [hereinafter Cellmark]; and Forensic Science Associates-Cetus Corporation,
Background Information, POLYMERASE CHAIN REACTION-PCR-TEHNOLOGY (3053
Research Drive, Richmond, Cal. 94806; postmarked Oct. 18, 1989) [hereinafter
Forensic]. Promotional literature is available from these laboratories. The FBI has also
opened its lab in Quantico, Virginia, and many states are setting up guidelines to
establish similar facilities.
8. Lifecodes, supra note 7, at 4.
9. Cellmark, supra note 7, at 10.
10. Id. (uses for scientific research, pharmaceutical and bioteehnology companies,
and animal applications of establishing pedigree); see also Lewin, Limits in DNA
Fingerprinting, 243 SCi. 1549 (1989) (use of DNA typing for behavioral ecology).
11. Anderson, DNA Evidence Questioned, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 18, 19.
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There is certainly no doubt" that, when all is said and done, this
technology will significantly alter the manner in which many crimes are
investigated and tried. 3
II. THE "DNA PARADIGM"
14
"There is nothing controversial about the theory underlying DNA
typing. Indeed, this theory is so well accepted that its accuracy is
unlikely even to be raised as an issue in hearings on the admissibility of
the new tests."15 It is essential to the analysis of technology transfer to
first understand the very basics of the DNA paradigm and its theoretical
premises before we can comprehend the possible distortions when it is
12. DNA Profiles are beginning to generate at least some base level concern when
utilized in a forensic setting - to the extent that there is little doubt that the technique,
when done correctly and under the appropriate conditions will revolutionize many areas
of the law. However, one must never forget the lesson of the Paraffin Test. This
scientific test, which turned out eventually to be erroneous, was used for years to
determine whether someone had fired a gun. See generally Jonakait, Will Blood Tell?
Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMoRY L.J. 833, 854-57 (1982).
13. Address by Peter Coddington, Deputy Chief of Appeals Bureau, Bronx District
Attorney, Panel Discussion on the Constitutionality of DNA Fingerprinting and Testing,
New York Law School, New York (Nov. 15, 1989). Mr. Coddington pointed to the
phenomenal overload of the Bronx Criminal Court calendar and the potential use of
DNA exclusions to allow the staff to focus their energies on known criminals without
wasting their time attempting to prosecute spurious cases. Id.
14. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 60 & n.72 (1989). This Note heavily relies
upon the two articles cited herein by Thompson & Ford for its scientific understanding
of DNA Profiles. See infra note 37. William C. Thompson is an Assistant Professor,
University of California, Irvine. Simon Ford is a Research Scientist, University of
California, Irvine.
15. Id. at 60. This contention has been recently confirmed in Caldwell v. Georgia,
260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990), where the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that:
"The defendant's quarrel with DNA identification is not with the science on which it is
based, nor with the general scientific acceptability of the techniques used to generate an
'autoradiograph."' Id. at 281, 393 S.E.2d at 437. The defendant's concerns essentially
are Lifecodes' quality control, the manner in which it declares a "match," and in its
probability calculations. Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific
Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465, 475 (1990) [hereinafter
The Dark Side]; see also Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, _, 565 N.E.2d
440, 441-42.
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applied to forensic science.16
DNA is an organic substance found primarily in the nucleus of
living cells and comprises the chromosomes within the nucleus of these
cells."7 This provides the genetic code which determines a person's
individual characteristics." Therefore, in analyzing DNA Profiling, it
is essential to understand that every cell contains DNA (except red blood
cells) 9 and that all DNA in the body is exactly the same at all times in
a person's life - it is "unique but unchanging. " '
The rudimentary aspects of DNA composition were discovered in
1956 by Watson and Crick.2 "The structure of DNA is similar to a
long, twisted ladder. . . . [It] is twisted into a spiral, giving rise to the
often used DNA nickname, the 'Double Helix.'"" The sides of this
ladder are composed of phosphates and sugars which hold together the
rungs (or stairs) of the ladder - these are called bases.' There are
approximately three billion base pairs (the rungs or stairs) in every human
cell.' There are, however, only four bases and they are known by their
initials, A, G, C, and T. Our paradigm (the ladder in the example) is
simplified further by the fact that only A can make a pair with T (one
rung) and C can only make a pair with G. This means that "[t]he sites
are palindromic, i.e. the order of bases in the bottom strand [one side of
the ladder] is exactly the reverse of those in the top strand [other side of
16. Kelly, Rankin, & Wink, Method and Applications of DNA Fingerprinting: A
Guide for the Non-Scientist, 73 CRIM. L. REV. 105, 105 n.2 (1987). "By necessity the
treatment of technical information has been simplified for the lay reader. Those wishing
a more comprehensive treatment should consult D.J. Weatherall, The New Genetics and
Clinical Practice (2nd ed. 1985)." Id.
17. Note, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 909
(1988) [hereinafter DNA Identification] ("The differences we see in each other are the
outward manifestations of each person's unique DNA pattern.").
18. Hicks, DNA Profiling: A Tool for Law Enforcement, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL., Aug. 1988, at 1, 2.
19. DNA Identification, supra note 17, at 909 n.27.
20. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 61-62.
21. Id. at 60 n.72. The structure of DNA was first described in Watson & Crick,
Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acid: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171
NATURE 737 (1953). For a scholarly history of the developments that lead to the DNA
paradigm, see R. OLBY, THE PATH TO THE DOUBLE HELix (1974).
22. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 62 & n.77 (citation omitted).
23. Id.
24. DNA Identification, supra note 17, at 910 (citing White & Lalouel, Chromosome




Although it is commonly accepted that every person has a unique
molecular pattern of DNA in its entirety,' any "profile" or "print" of
DNA known to science analyzes only a minute portion of the DNA strand
which may not be not unique to the individualY This somewhat basic,
and often overlooked fact, however, is the crux of why there is such
controversy with the "technology transfer." "One reason people so
readily believe the technique to be virtually infallible is that they confuse
DNA itself with the 'print' derived from it."' It is essential to
remember that DNA Profiles are not unique when:
Scientists from one of the three private genetic
fingerprinting labs in the United States go to court and
testify about the unlikelihood that the match could be
coincidental. Officials from Lifecodes Corporation have
testified that the odds are one in ten billion that samples
from two different people would yield matching prints.
Officials with Cellmark Diagnostics have testified that the
odds of a coincidental match are one in 30 billion."9
Confronted with numbers such as these, defendants have been left with no
choice but to either plead guilty' or "[t]o adopt an absurd defense...
",31 A defendant, regardless of culpability, would hardly be able to raise
25. Kelly, Rankin & Wink, supra note 16, at 107.
26. DNA Identification, supra note 17, at 909 n.24 (citing Von Beroldingen &
Sensabaugh, Forensic DNA Analysis, 12 TIELINE 27 (1987)). "The only exception is
identical twins, who have identical DNA." id. (citing Hill & Jeffreys, Use of
Minisatellite Probes for Determination of Twin Zygosity at Birth, LANcET, Dec. 21-28,
1985, at 1394).
27. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 NATURE 501 (1989) ("Of the 3,000
million nucleotides which we inherit from each parent, about 1 in 1,000 is a site of
variation, or polymorphism, in the population.").
28. Thompson, supra note 5.
29. Id.
30. DNA Identification, supra note 17, at 904 (citing State v. Haynes, No. 87-1-
02309-7 (Pierce Cty. Sup. Ct., Wash., Mar. 28, 1988)).
31. Saslow, Murder Trial Offers DNA Test, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, § 21, at
16, col. 4; see also Michaud, DNA Detectives, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, § 6
(Magazine), at 89 (quoting Mac McLeod, Assistant State Attorney in Daytona Beach,
Fla.) ("If they print your guy with this stuff you're dead. You can't combat it. There
is no defense to it.").
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a "reasonable doubt" in the mind of a jury which has been told by a
renowned scientist that the odds that it is not the victims' blood on the
defendant's clothing is one in 30 billion. Thus, perhaps the greatest
concern associated with the use of scientific evidence at trial is the impact
on the jury. As one court noted, "'scientific proof may in some instances
assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
laymen.' "32
III. DNA PROFILES - GENERAL CONCEPTS
The aim of the DNA Profile is to take the Paradigm and be able
to exploit the fact that the strand, in its entirety, is different in every
individual, except identical twins. 3 An important caveat, however, is
that "the similarities among individuals of the same species far outnumber
the differences. "I To simplify understanding later when the analysis
becomes more complex, a brief explanation will first be made in order to
highlight two main concepts in DNA Profiling.
Natural defense systems known as restriction enzymes occur in
some bacteria. These enzymes recognize certain palindromic sequences
and break the DNA at that point.35
The enzyme acts as a "magic pair of scissors"; it
recognizes a specific base sequence in the DNA and
cleaves the DNA only at that place. . . . Because the
restriction enzymes cut only at their specific recognition
sequences, digesting a person's DNA with a certain
restriction enzyme will produce the same pieces every
time.6
32. Note, Fit to Be Fryed." Frye v. United States and the Admissability of Novel
Scientific Evidence, 77 KY. L.J. 849; 853 (1988-89) [hereinafter Fit to Be Fryed
(quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
33. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 63.
34. Id.; see also Moody, DNA Analysis in Forensic Science, BioscI., Jan. 1989, at
31. "Most of the three billion basepairs (bp) of the human genome are conserved in the
population, as the average heterozygosity is approximately 0.001 per base pair. Some
loci, however, are highly variable, and the variability of these loci make the DNA of
each person unique." Id. (citation omitted).
35. Kelly, Rankin & Wink, supra note 16, at 107.
36. Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pifalls of a New Technique, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 455, 457-58 (1988) (citing B. LEWiN, GENEs II 68-70 (1985)).
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However, in samples from different individuals, the length of these key
DNA fragments, although cut at the same sequence, is likely to differ due
to the different sequences within the piece. These differences are called
length polymorphisms.37
The discovery that essentially enabled DNA to be "typed" was the
development of genetic probes that are capable of identifying the
polymorphic DNA segments; those small areas within the DNA chain
where the differences among individuals are the most pronounced. 38 The
probes are essentially small pieces of DNA that are chemically
engineered 9 in a specific base sequence that, because they are
palindromic, will only be able to bind with a reverse sequence. 40
It should be noted that it is these identifiable length
polymorphisms that are the subject of the rest of the DNA testing and
analysis. The lab will compare the length polymorphism from the DNA
found at the crime scene4' with the length polymorphism extracted from
the suspects DNA and decide whether they match.42
Polymorphic DNA segments are compared in two different ways.
The Cellmark and Lifecodes laboratories use the test known as
"'restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis' ('RFLP
analysis')." 3 These tests essentially measure the resulting polymorphic
fragments to see if they match. They differ, however, in the probes that
37. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Promising Forensic Technique Needs
Additional Validation, TRIAL, Sept. 1988, at 58-59 [hereinafter DNA Typing].
38. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 63.
39. See infra note 150.
40. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 63 n.82 (citing R. OLD & S. PRIMROSE,
PRINCIPLES OF GENE MANIPULATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ENGINEERING
(1985)).
41. This would also be the procedure for any other type of DNA analysis, such as
from a child in a paternity DNA profile. See generally Lifecodes, supra note 7, at 14;
Cellmark, supra note 7, at 8.
42. For an excellent critique of matching to declare "inclusion" or "exclusion," see
People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1989). It is
primarily at the above two technological stages (the use of restriction enzymes and
probes) that various labs begin to deviate. Note should also be made that neither lab
disagrees with the accuracy of the others' approach - each makes a balancing decision
between the level of certainty, amount of DNA required, and the quality of the sample
DNA necessary to make an accurate analysis.
43. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 64-76.
1990]
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they use to detect these fragments." It is the RFLP analysis that has
been the subject of this analysis and that will continue to be addressed as
it has been the most widely used in paternity and forensic testing and has
received the closest scrutiny by the courts. A brief look, however, should
be made of the second approach as it has enormous potential to further
revolutionize forensic science, as well as medicine and fundamental
molecular biology research.'
The Cetus' laboratory utilizes the second approach in comparing
polymorphic DNA segments, known as "allele specific probe analysis." 4
Although restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis has been the
most widely used and accepted, the DNA profiles from that test depend
on the DNA being relatively undegraded and of sufficient quantity."
However, these amounts of undegraded DNA are
frequently not available from forensic evidence in
practice. The short history of forensic DNA analysis to
date suggests that a large proportion of forensic cases
involving biological evidence are not amenable to RFLP
analysis either because the amount of biological material
44. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 72.
The Lifecodes DNA-Print test uses single-locus
probes, which lock onto polymorphic DNA
segments that occur only once on the human
DNA chain. . . . Cellmark also uses single-
locus probes for criminal cases. For paternity
cases, however, Cellmark uses multi-locus
probes, which lock onto "families" of
polymorphic DNA segments that occur at many
locations on the human DNA chain.
Id.
45. See Marx, Multiplying Genes by Leaps and Bounds, 240 ScI. 1408 (1988); see
also Grissom, PCR Expands, Creates Revolution, SCiENTIsT, July 10, 1989, at 14.
46. Forensic, supra note 7, at 1. The Cetus Corporation has been granted its fifth
patent relating to its GeneAmp polymerase chain reaction technology. Cetus Corp.,
Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1990, at B4, col. 2.
47. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 76.
48. C. VON BEROLDINGEN, E. BLAKE, R. HIGUCHI & H. ERLICH, PCR
TECHNOLOGY - PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS FOR DNA AMPLIFICATION 209-23 (H.
Erlich & M. Stockton eds. 1989) [hereinafter PCR TECHNOLOGY]. "At least 50 ng of
high molecular weight DNA is required for RFLP analysis using a single locus probe
and greater than 100 ng for multilocus probe analysis." Id. at 209 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. VIII
is too limited or the DNA it contains is too degraded. 9
To overcome often insufficient samples, the Cetus Corporation has
developed an amplification process of the DNA that is made possible
through polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
Basically, the objective of the PCR approach is to analyze a
specific segment of DNA (the allele) to amplify and reproduce only that
segment.' "Using PCR, scientists can copy target DNA sequences,
leaving other DNA sequences untouched, in a replication chain reaction
which generates a massive increase in the copies of target DNA." 51 The
reason we are currently more concerned with the RFLP method is that,
for the time being at least, only a few marker systems that can target a
specific allele are sufficiently well characterized for their use in forensic
DNA analysis. The result is that the power of discrimination of these
systems is presently not as high as those employed in RFLP analysis. 2
However, as scientists understand the properties of these probes better
every year and as the corresponding technology increases, so will the
feasibility of targeting new allele pairs. For example, "RFLP's are
generally discovered by accident; scientists find and characterize a few
more each year."53
The last concept to keep in mind while reviewing the problems of
technology transfer is the appropriate standard of review to be applied for
admissability of DNA Profiles in the courtroom.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the
49. Id. at 209.
50. DNA Typing, supra note 37, at 59. The approach to DNA typing used by Cetus
detects the presence of certain polymorphic DNA segments or "alleles" in the biological
sample. PCR TECHNOLOGY, supra note 48, at 209.
51. Forensic, supra note 7, at 1.
52. See PCR TECHNOLOGY, supra note 48, at 210.
53. Burk, supra note 36, at 461. "A recent example with possible forensic
applications is reported by Ali, DNA Fingerprinting by Oligonucleotide Probes Specific
for Simple Repeats, 24 HuM. GEN. 239 (1986)." Id. at 461 n.20.
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deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.'
This is the most commonly used standard for determining the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence (developed in 1923 in Frye v. United
States"5) known as the Frye Test.s To date, DNA Profiles have
54. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
55. Frye, 293 F. at 1016.
56. Fit to Be Fryed, supra note 32, at 858; see also Imwinkelried, A New Era in
the Evolution of Scientific Evidence - A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific
Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 264 (1981-82); Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
Another standard used among a minority of states is the Relevancy Test.
The Federal Rules of Evidence,
adopted in 1975, although not explicitly
overruling Frye, endorse a relevancy standard
for all kinds of evidence: Rule 401 defines
"relevant evidence"; Rule 402 states that relevant
evidence is generally admissible; Rule 403 states
that relevant evidence may be excluded on the
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of
time; and Rule 702 generally allows experts to
testify on anything that will help the trier of fact.
The Dark Side, supra note 15, at 507-08 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, DNA
Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 665, 686
(1989) [hereinafter DNA Printing]. For an application of the Relevancy Test as
employed by the federal courts in the determination of admissibility of DNA Profiles,
see United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 254-55 (D. Vt. 1990), where the
United States District Court for the District of Vermont acknowledged that the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), had rejected Frye
in favor of the more flexible approach taken by the Relevancy Test. Jakobetz, 747 F.
Supp. at 254. The Jakobetz court stated: "Thus, the test is inherently a balancing one
that weighs the probativeness, materiality, and reliability of the evidence against the
tendency to mislead or confuse the jury, or unfairly prejudice the defendant." Id.
(citation omitted). For an analysis of the factors considered in Williams and a further
delineation of relevant considerations, see id. at 254-55.
See also Caldwell v. Georgia, 260 Ga. 278, 398 S.E.2d 436 (1990) (rejecting
the Frye Test in determining the admissibility of DNA profiles). In Caldwell, the court
noted that the "counting (scientific) heads" approach that the Frye Test utilized is
rejected in favor of a method in which the trial judge makes the determination whether
the technique is at a stage of verifiable certainty. Id. at 292-93, 393 S.E.2d at 441.
This approach lets the admissability decision be made by the judge rather than the
scientific community. Id.
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overwhelmingly been determined admissible under this standard.57 The
reason for this high rate of admissibility is twofold. First, DNA Profiles
are generally accepted by the scientific community when used in a clinical
study. The courts are just beginning to grapple with the extensive
scientific difficulties that the forensic use of this technology provides.5"
Second, courts have been willing to stray from the more orthodox
"general acceptance in the scientific community" standard in the
application of the Frye Test to a more lenient standard of "conformity 'to
a generally accepted explanatory theory."'
57. As of September 6, 1989, admissability statistics regarding DNA Profiles have
been impressive.
Courts in twenty-four states have
admitted forensic DNA evidence at least once in
criminal cases, with Florida leading the other
states, having admitted DNA forensic analysis
evidence at least fifteen times to date. At least
thirty Frye hearings on the admissability of DNA
evidence have been completed nationwide. With
one exception, the trial courts have uniformly
found that forensic DNA typing passes the Frye
test.
DNA: Report of New York State Forensic DNA Panel, Sept. 6, 1989, at 18-19
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter New York State Report]. "The other states to admit
DNA evidence are New York, Maryland, Virginia, Texas, Washington, Michigan,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Kansas, Ohio, Indiana, Alabama, Colorado, West Virginia,
Mississippi, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Hawaii, Idaho, Georgia, Iowa, Missouri and
Tennessee." Id. at 19 n.11.
58. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 957-58, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986. The court determined
that DNA Profiles passed a unique application of an altered Frye Test, however, it did
approach the scientific difficulties at hand and determined the evidence as to inclusion
was not admissible. For a sample of a typical, albeit somewhat overly optimistic, Frye
hearing on the subject of DNA Profiling, see People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533
N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
59. United States v. Yee, No.3: 89CR0720 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990) (LEXIS,
GenFed Library, Dist. File 15908) (report and recommendation admitting evidence).
In one of the most pro-DNA decisions to date, Magistrate James G. Carr held an
extensive six week hearing and decided, subject to review by the Article III judge to
whom the case is assigned for trial, that DNA profiles pass the Sixth Circuit's
application of the Frye Test. This is significant because many courts may adopt the
Magistrate's findings of fact. The case is also noteworthy for the proposition that "[a]
court need not find that there is unanimity or consensus within the scientific community
concerning such acceptability." Bishop, A Victory for Genetic Fingerprinting, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1990, at B6 (Law), col. 4.
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The nearly unlimited success of DNA being admitted into
evidence has raised serious concerns about the ability of our criminal
justice system to cope with novel scientific evidence.' In fact, one
expert on scientific evidence believes that "'[u]nder the Frye standard the
decision on whether or not to admit the evidence is, in effect, delegated
out of the judge's hands . . . . "" What is essentially being done is to
give the final decision over what should be admissible in a court of law
to the scientific community. Case law has begun to illustrate, however,
that this is not working. What works as "generally acceptable" in
scientific theory does not always work in the reality of forensics. This
result has caused one commentator to state that "[tihe scientific dispute
over the reliability of the technique is playing itself out in the adversarial
environment of the courtroom, where rules of evidence, stilted formalism,
leading questions, and protections of proprietary information hinder open
scientific inquiry."62 It is inappropriate for science, the courts, and
society to allow these defendants to be used as fodder in the battle over
the admissibility of this evidence.
On February 12, 1991, in Arizona v. Despain,63 the Arizona
State Superior Court for Yuma County applied the Frye "general
acceptance" standard.' This brief but straightforward opinion excluded
DNA evidence based on the original Frye language without recent glosses,
as many jurisdictions have allowed.' The court stated that "[t]o
determine if the test of general acceptance is met, the appropriate
scientific community must first be identified, and then it must be
60. See Williams, Conviction by Chromosome, STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1989, at 26.
The question is whether DNA evidence has been
so successful because it is an accurate tool or
because judges, juries, and attorneys, most of
whom have limited backgrounds in microbiology,
have been unprepared to challenge it. Put more
simply, is DNA profiling ready for the
courtroom? Is the courtroom ready for DNA?
Id.
61. Id. at 28 (quoting Edward Imwinkelried, a professor at the University of
California at Davis Law School who specializes in the admissibility of scientific evidence
in the courtroom).
62. T"he Dark Side, supra note 15, at 525.
63. No. 15589 (Yuma Cty. Sup. Ct., Ariz., Feb. 12, 1991) (order excluding DNA
tests performed by the FBI laboratory).
64. Id., slip op. at 1-2 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
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determined whether that community generally accepts both the theory and
the technique applying it."" After determining the fields and
backgrounds of the experts testifying,67 the court concluded that there
had been a sufficient presentation from the relevant scientific community
and that their opinions were truly representative of that community."
Thus, for the court, "[t]he remaining and very important question is
whether the controversy between them is legitimate and significant. If so,
it is not the function of any court to resolve that scientific controversy. "'
Therefore, in this simple analysis, the court reasoned that the existence of
a legitimate scientific controversy within the scientific community, in and
of itself, precluded any finding of "general acceptance" and thus the
admission of the DNA evidence had to be denied.'
Unless other courts similarly devise adequate standards for
determining the admissibility of this new scientific evidence, DNA
Profiles will generally continue to pass Frye muster, and any objection to
the admissibility thereof will in all probability be directed toward the
technique used in the specific case in question. The bottom line is that
any problems with DNA Profiles will thus go "to the weight (or
credibility), not the admissibility, of DNA printing."" The fault,
however, with directing an attack on DNA evidence based upon its weight
is twofold. First, any error in the general process or specific procedure
involved can and will render the Profile totally devoid of any probative
value; and second, errors such as these would render the evidence,
regardless of its apparent weight, unduly prejudicial and, therefore,
inadmissable.'
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3-4 (the testifying experts were mainly from the contingency of experts
that had testified at the DNA Frye hearings).
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id. (emphasis added). "'The Court may not resolve a scientific dispute between
proponents and opponents of the technique, so the very existence of the dispute precludes
admission of the testimony.'" id. at 8 (quoting Starr v. Campos, 134 Ariz. 254, 257,
655 P.2d 794, 797 (App. 1982)).
70. Id. at 7-8.
71. DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 696 (emphasis in original); see also People v.
Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 317, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
72. Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, _, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441. In
Cumin, the trial court judge explicitly stated that any "deficiencies" in the overall
technique of DNA profiles, or any "deficiencies" in that specific case, would go to the
weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. Id. at _, 565 N.E.2d at 442 n.4.
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the trial court's
'1990]
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The reader must keep in mind the impact this will have on a jury
of laymen while reading this and trying to maintain interest in a very
complex undertaking." One observer of this effect on the jury has noted
that "[a]s [a Lifecodes scientist] went through her testimony, dry,
technical and frequently repetitive under cross-examination, some
members of the jury seemed to be having trouble paying attention. If they
were not dozing, several did have their eyes closed."74
IV. RESTRICTION FRAGMENT LENGTH POLYMORPHISMS:
PROCEDURES
The standard methods for RFLP analysis that are used by
Lifecodes and Cellmark have been successfully illustrated by breaking
them down into seven distinct scientific methods. 6 It is important to
keep in mind that "[u]nreliability in any one of these procedures can
compromise the overall validity of the test. Like a chain, the RFLP
approach is only as strong as its weakest link. "'
admission of the evidence was erroneous and stated that
[e]vidence of this nature, based on the scientific
principle that every human has unique genetic
characteristics and having an aura of infallibility,
must have a strong impact on the jury. The
erroneous admission of such evidence would
undoubtedly be prejudicial in any case where, as
here, the identification of the person who
committed the crime is in serious dispute.
Id. at __, 565 N.E.2d at 441.
73. See generally Williams, supra note 60. "'My definition of a lawyer is someone
who didn't do very well in science .... It's such an incredible commitment of your
time and effort to try to learn the process. It's a mind-bender."' Id. at 32 (quoting
Charles Leonard, part-time public defender for the Allen County Public Defender's
Office, Ind.).
74. Lyall, DNA Tests Link Golub to Killing, Expert Says, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1990, at B4, col. 5.
75. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 64-76; see also People v. Castro, 144
Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); United States v. Jakobetz, 747
F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990); Caldwell v. Georgia, 260 Ga. 278, 398 S.E.2d 436 (1990).
76. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 64 n.85 ("[Miost of these techniques can
be found in T. Maenads, E. Fritch & J. Sambrook, Molecular Cloning, A Laboratory
Manual (1982)."); see also People v. Shi Fu Huang, 145 Misc. 2d 513, 546 N.Y.S.2d
920 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
77. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 64.
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The first step involved is the extraction of the DNA from
whatever source is available.' This entails washing the biological
material from its present surface, whether it be from clothing in forensics
or laboratory equipment in paternity, and bursting the cells with a
chemical and enzyme treatment to release the DNA.' This may be
complicated by the presence of different cell types. In rape cases, for
example, it is necessary that the sperm cells be separated from the vaginal
cells by differential analysis and centrifugation.' The DNA is further
prepared by a cleaning using enzymes and organic solvents."1
The second step, restriction digestion, has already been discussed
as one of the integral discoveries leading to the availability of DNA
Profiles.' This procedure entails the application of restriction enzymes
to the prepared DNA sample to cut the strand at pre-determined allele
sequences.
The third step is that of Gel Electrophoresis. The resulting
fragments of the DNA (left after they have been cut in restriction
digestion) are placed on an electrically charged slab of agarose gel. This
will cause the DNA fragments to move towards the positive electrode.
The shorter fragments move more quickly than longer ones because of
their ability to move in the gel. The result is that the fragments are
eventually arrayed across the gel in positions that correspond to their
length.83
Step number four consists of making a permanent copy of the
array of DNA fragments in the gel. This is accomplished by a method
known as "Southern Blotting."" This consists of placing a nylon
78. This is the first scientific step, but it is important to note that in forensic use,
a prior step would be to successfully obtain and package a sample for delivery to the lab.
See FBIAnnounces New DNA Policy, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 1989, at 23
(setting forth specific guidelines for packaging and shipment of DNA samples); see also
supra note 7.
79. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 65.
80. Id. at 65 & n.86 (citing Gill, Jeffreys & Werrett, Forensic Application of DNA
'Fingerprints,' 318 NATURE 577, 578 (1985); Giusti, Baird, Pascuale, Balazs &
Glassberg, Application of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Polymorphisms to the Analysis
of DNA Recovered from Sperm, 31 J. FORENSIC ScI. 409, 410-12 (1986)).
81. Id. at 65.
82. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
83. DNA Typing, supra note 37, at 59.
84. Biologist Edward Southern developed Southern Blotting. See Southern,
Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA Fragments Separated by Gel
Electrophoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLoGY 503 (1975).
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membrane over the gel so that the DNA fragments will attach themselves
to the membrane in the same positions they occupy on the gel. s The
membrane is treated with a chemical that causes the base pairs to separate
so that, although both sides of the conjectural "ladder" are no longer
connected, the sequence of bases on either side remain the same." The
blot is now prepared for the previously prepared probe to be added to
bind with specific separated fragments on the blot.
The "binding" of the fragments is step five: hybridization. "At
this point, finding the key polymorphic segments among all the other
DNA segments on the blot is like finding a needle in a haystack. . . . [I]n
RFLP analysis, the DNA [like hay] is spread out by electrophoresis and
a genetic probe acts as a 'biological magnet' [to find the needle]. " v The
probes are previously "tagged" with a radioactive marker so that when
they lock onto the polymorphic segments, their position on the blot can
be determined by the next step."5
Step six consists of placing the blot on a piece of X-ray film so
that the radioactively marked probes, and thus their binded polymorphic
DNA segments, can be visualized.
Energy from the radioactively-tagged probe exposes the
film, producing a pattern of bands known as the "DNA
print." The position of each band on the DNA print
indicates the location of a polymorphic segment on the
blot. The location of each segment on the blot is, in
turn, an indication of the length of the DNA fragment
which contains the segment. Because individuals vary in
the length of the DNA fragments containing the
polymorphic DNA segments, individuals tend to differ in
the position of their bands on a DNA print."
85. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 71.
86. This may be easier to visualize if you focus on a ladder, with our base pairs
occupying either side of the same rung on the ladder. When the chemical is added, the
ladder splits down the middle, so that although there are no longer pairs, the sequence
of the bases (without their palindromic mate) along the sides of the ladder remain the
same.
87. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 71.
88. Id. at 71-72.
89. Id. at 74.
[Vol. VIII
Existing now is a DNA Profile that can be compared to another Profile
compiled by using the same methods and probes.
The final step is the interpretation and comparison of the DNA
Profile with the other similarly compiled Profile. The two are usually just
visually compared to see if they match,' however, machines can also
be utilized to give a mathematical -approach to the existing congruency
between the two profiles. The difficulty with using the machines is that,
although they may be able to give a more objective reading than the
scientist, they are only able to output the protocols that the scientist
installed into the program.
V. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The heart of the problem lies not merely with the present state of
the technology but also with the difficulties that arise when the otherwise
pristine nature of scientific DNA Profiles are applied to the less than
sterile conditions of the forensic environment. 91 This occurs without
adequate safeguards to compensate for the loss of control that is suffered
when a cogent scientific theory gets forced beyond the laboratory and into
the uncontrolled world of forensics. "The transfer of a technology
developed in a research laboratory to a forensic setting can be a
complicated and time-consuming process. There are many hurdles that
must be overcome, and many questions that must be answered. The
power of this technology makes abuse a serious concern."' The courts
have had enough experience to know that scientific techniques which are
reliable for one purpose in a particular field are not necessarily reliable
when applied to forensics." The overall difficulty with the use of DNA
Profiling has been the rush to utilize its amazing potential by transferring
it from the scientific laboratory to the courtroom.
With due respect, the courts have been too hasty.
Although DNA fingerprinting clearly offers tremendous
potential as a forensic tool, the rush to the court has
obscured two critical points: first, DNA fingerprinting
is far more technically demanding than DNA diagnostics;
and second, the scientific community has not yet agreed
90. See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
91. DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 671.
92. New York State Report, supra note 57, at i.
93. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 15.
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on standards that ensure the reliability of the evidence.'
The problem is that DNA Profiles in the diagnostic realm are accepted
within the scientific community because of their "built-in consistency
checks which guard against many errors and artefacts."95  These
consistency checks, to date, are not found in the forensic setting.
The most significant problem with technology transfer is that
scientists simply do not have a grasp on how the contamination and
degradation of the forensic samples affect their otherwise diagnostically
verifiable results. DNA advocates claim that overly degraded or
contaminated samples will not produce a false reading or inculpate an
innocent party; rather they will produce no Profile at all." This
premise, on which much of the faith of DNA Profiling currently relies,
is completely untrue. The problem is that a decayed or contaminated
sample can and will produce some visible bands and as the number of
these bands decline, so does the resulting allele frequency in the
population.' At the present time there simply has not been enough
experimentation to provide the empirical data integral to introducing DNA
Profiles as conclusive (30 billion to one) evidence."
Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld have summarized the differences
between DNA Profiles in diagnostics and forensics.' First, in
diagnostics, you have at most two alternate choices for each of the child's
alleles - his or her mother or father. However, in forensics "the universe
of alternatives frequently includes 50 to 100 alleles, often bunched closely
together with differences exceedingly difficult to resolve."'" Second,
in diagnostics, the scientist has an unlimited source of DNA and can
94. Lander, supra note 27, at 501.
95. Id.
96. See DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 668; see also United States v. Jakobetz,
747 F. Supp. 250, 259. "mhe court finds that . . . the potential rate of error (false
positive) for RFLP matching is exceedingly low." Id. The court referred to this as the
"fail-safe" characteristic of DNA Profiles. Id.
97. DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 669 & n.21 (citing Werrett & Lygo, DNA
Profiling, 84 L. Soc'Y's GUARDIAN GAZETTE 3637, 3643 (1987)).
98. Id. at 671 ("mhe head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's serology unit
admitted: 'We've only done a limited number of tests yet. So we can't say with absolute
certainty that [the technique] works on different sizes of stains, aged stains, [or]
putrefied stains.'') (citing Thompson, DNA's Troubled Debut, CAL. L. REV., June 1988,
at 36, 44).
99. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 21-22.
100. Id. at 21.
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easily re-perform the test until any possible vagueness is discounted. In
forensics, however, the sample is often so minuscule that the scientist may
not be able to run additional checks. Third, in diagnostics, the DNA
from the mother and father are present on the gel to provide for an
additional check. However, this in not available in forensics. Fourth, in
diagnostics, because of the clinical setting, there is rarely any
contamination. If contamination should occur the scientist has an ample
supply of DNA. In forensics contamination and degradation becomes the
rule rather than the exception.1 The laboratories must deal with a host
of environmental conditions that are specifically protected against in
diagnostics. Lastly, in diagnostics, the scientist need only declare that the
DNA match and the controls suffice to prove inheritance. However, in
forensics the scientist must go beyond the match and declare the
probability of that match in the population.
VI. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE FORENSIC USE
OF DNA PROFILES 1"
On February 5, 1987, Joseph Castro stabbed Vilma Ponce and her
two year old daughter to death." Vilma Ponce was twenty years old
and was seven months pregnant at the time. 4 Acting on an anonymous
tip, police arrested Joseph Castro and seized his wristwatch, which bore
minute bloodstains that were later submitted for DNA testing."°5 This
was the beginning of a saga that would soon be referred to as the most
comprehensive and extensive legal examination of forensic DNA tests held
to date.1"4 The hearing took place over a twelve week period and
101. Id.
102. Special note should be taken that the lion's share of information taken in
SECTIONS VI & VII, infra notes 102-85 and accompanying text, are derived from
People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). The
admissibility decision, the brief for the prosecution, the defendants reply brief, and the
defendants memorandum in opposition to the introduction of the DNA evidence have all
been utilized.
103. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 956-57, 979-80, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985-86, 999. Note should be made
that Justice Gerald Sheindlin of the New York State Supreme Court deserves much credit
for taking the time for a special decision on the admissability of DNA Profiles and, more
significantly, the thought that went into the ultimate decision. For an excellent Note on
the significance of the Castro case, see The Dark Side, supra note 15, at 476-538.
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produced a five thousand page transcript.'" Of special consequence is:
first, Castro involved an extraordinary assembly of the United States most
celebrated scientists; ' second, several of the prosecutions experts
recanted their testimony after full disclosure of the laboratories actual
procedures;"° and third, the prosecution actually conceded that the
evidence as to inclusion110 was faulted and determined not to contest the
admissibility issue on this point."' Furthermore, "[t]his admission [that
the evidence was flawed] followed a statement by two prosecution experts
who joined with defense experts in calling for a study by the National
Academy of Sciences 'to reach general scientific agreement about
appropriate standards for the practice of forensic DNA typing."'"2
Even more significantly, the validity of a key peer review article113
which had been relied upon by the prosecution in previous New York
Frye hearings was seriously challenged when the article's peer reviewer
testified in the Castro case.1 4  Thus, the issues discussed below
generally consist of a consensus of the vanguard of America's most
preeminent scientists.
The most significant flaw in present DNA technology tends to be
more along the spectrum of a legal problem then that of pure science, or
107. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 961, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
108. Testifying for the prosecution were: Dr. Richard Roberts, Dr. Pablo
Rubinstein, Dr. Michael Baird, Dr. Carl Dobkin and Alan Giusti. Testifying for the
defense were: Dr. Conrad Gilliam, Dr. Lorraine Flaherty, Dr. Eric Lander, Dr. Phillip
Green and Dr. Howard Cooke. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 957-58, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 980-
81 (N.Y.Sup Ct. 1989).
109. Reply Brief for Defendant at 7, People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (No. 1508/87).
110. See generally New York State Report, supra note 57, at 24. Due to the
complexities of DNA Profiles, its much more conclusive to determine that a match does
not exist (i.e., the defendant is excluded), than to determine a match does, in fact, exist
(i.e., the defendant and the forensic sample are one in the same). Also consistent with
scientific fact is the legal reality that our criminal justice system tolerates the exoneration
of a guilty suspect more than the conviction of an innocent defendant. Id.
111. Brief for Prosecution at 33, People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545
N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (No. 1508/87).
112. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 21 (quoting expert witnesses in
Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 979).
113. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2 ("Dr. Phillip Green, the peer reviewer of the
February 1989 article where Lifecodes described its methods, came forward to testify
that given the facts he now knows, the article never would have been accepted as written
114. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 21.
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at the very least it is a distinct problem with the "scientific method." That
flaw is the consequential declaration that two DNA Profiles match." 5
"[T]esting laborator[ies] may be making life and death decisions or at a
minimum, judgments which significantly impact on the life of an
individual. The evidence in [the Castro] case reveals in shocking clarity
that there are no reliable standards in place for identifying, reporting, or
interpreting bands in forensic cases." ''"6 The inherent flaw is that
matches are declared visually, they are "eyeballed. ""'
[V]isual matching is inappropriate in DNA fingerprinting,
inasmuch as (1) many alleles have very similar sizes; (2)
the accuracy of the measurement process is reported to be
known; and (3) without an objective definition of a
match, there is no meaningful way to determine the
probability that a declared match might have arisen by
chance .... 118
The problem with visual matching is amplified by less than rigorous
application of the scientific method, as in the Castro case where the
testing laboratory clearly did not follow generally accepted scientific
methodology.' 19
One of the most serious flaws in forensic DNA analysis results
from the tolerance of examiner bias." This derives from the fact that
115. Id. at 22-23.
Scientists disagree over the criteria for
determining whether or not two samples match;
the types and number of probes that should be
examined; the control experiments required in
forensic testing, where there is frequently no
opportunity to repeat the experiment; the
population studies required; and the appropriate
formulas for calculating probabilities.
Id.
116. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 56 (emphasis added).
117. Thompson& Ford, supra note 14, at 74. For a discussion of visual matching,
see United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 256-59 (D. Vt. 1990). The court
stated that "the fact that a [visual] match must be measured by physical measurement
eliminates inconsistencies inherent whenever subjective judgments are involved." Id. at
257.
118. Lander, supra note 27, at 502-03.
119. See Memorandum, supra note 3, at 56-58.
120. Id. at 56.
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the laboratories currently have an enormous financial interest in the
success of DNA Profiles,121 and in the future, as the government slowly
takes control,22 it will have a prosecutorial interest." "The term
[examiner bias] is not meant to indicate malicious intent but rather an
admission that examiners have a tendency to see what they want to
see. it This element can be easily verified if the lab keeps adequate
records of "blind readings" (i.e. using different scientists) of the various
prints to be compared. This was evidently not done in the Castro
procedures. 25
Subjective assessments tend to pervade many areas of the DNA
testing procedures."
Despite the remarkable statistics that have been
quoted in court cases, and the very impressive nature of
DNA data as evidence, all stages of DNA analysis
require some form of subjective assessments.
Judgements must be made about whether a DNA sample
is of adequate quality for testing; whether a restriction
enzyme reaction is satisfactory; whether an
autoradiograph is of sufficient quality to read and
interpret; whether the most appropriate method is being
used to compare samples. 27
121. Id. at 14; see generally New York State Report, supra note 58.
122. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 39.
123. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 88.
Whether a match is declared between two prints
is a subjective judgment for the forensic expert.
Psychological research indicates that the
priorities of the decisionmaker dramatically
affect the subjective threshold decision .... For
the police criminalist, a key priority is helping
the state make its case. . . . For a scientist
employed by a company attempting to market a
DNA typing test, however, the key priority is to
demonstrate that there is a low probability of a
match between samples from different
individuals.
Id. (footnote omitted).
124. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 56.
125. Id. at 95.
126. See DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 669.
127. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 16.
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The visual matching problem is further distorted by a failure of
the testing facilities to adhere to previously set protocols for declaring a
match. In the Castro case this was all too evident. Published
protocols" for the laboratory claims matches would be declared if they
were within three standard deviations (+ or -) of each other (i.e. the
bands on the two sets of prints)."1 All this means is that each band on
the print is given a small range to differ and the odds are then calculated
that they would fall within that deviation from each other when compared
to the entire population - keeping in mind that the probabilities for many
bands are being computed at the same time. However, upon cross-
examination it was discovered that the bands did not meet this
standard."' When questioned, the laboratory suddenly stated that it
meant three standard deviations from the mean - which is up to six
deviations!"' "With the exceptions of [two scientists], all the defense
and prosecution experts agreed that 'three standard deviations from the
mean' or 'six standard deviations' would be an unacceptable objective
standard. "32
"Whatever matching rule is used to declare a forensic match, it
is axiomatic that the same matching rule must then be used for counting
the matches occurring in the population database." '' "One simply
cannot use one standard for determining whether there is a match with the
forensic sample and a different standard for determining the frequency
with which such matches might arise in the population.' In the
Castro case the lab used different methods, with the method employed for
the defendant being much more liberal than that for the population. 35
128. DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 673-74. "Quality control in American crime
laboratories remains on the honor system.... Variation of protocols ('Protocol Drift')
may cause inconsistent test results." Id. at 674.
129. See generally Memorandum, supra note 3, at 27. See also Lander, supra note
27, at 504.
130. See generally Memorandum, supra note 3, at 27 (three standard deviations
were what the laboratory had published in their peer-review articles).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Lander, supra note 27, at 503-04.
134. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 31 (emphasis in original).
135. See Lander, supra note 27, at 504.
Lifecodes uses a completely different approach:
the reported probability is essentially the
frequency of bands occurring in a window of
size ± 2/3 s.d.s. More exactly, as described in
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Thus, as noted by Dr. Lander, the estimated occurrence in the population
was fatally skewed." s
Currently the most debated issue regarding the forensic use of
DNA Profiles is that of the use of mixing experiments. 37 It appears
that nearly every scientist involved agreed,"' indeed as the Castro court
found, that when a sufficient quantity of DNA is available, a mixing test
should be run.139 The test is needed because the DNA fragments often
run through the gel"4' at different speeds and thus do not line up
exactly.14' Also, "[b]ecause DNA typing procedures are complex,
minor variations in the procedures or samples inevitably produce some
variability, called 'slop,' in the resulting prints." 42 Mixing experiments
could add a helpful check to determine the significance of bands that do
not line up exactly, whether from the lanes running abnormally or from
"slop" on the print.
Simplified, the test involves running the sample DNA in one lane,
the suspect DNA in another (thus far our basic procedure), and a mixture
an as yet unpublished paper, it is a weighted-
average of frequencies corresponding to such
intervals, with the terms weighted according to




Because the method involves averaging
frequencies corresponding to intervals that are
4.5-fold smaller than those allowed for declaring
a forensic match, the probability reported for
each allele will typically be too small by a factor
of about 4.5. Because each RFLP involves two
alleles, the probability may thus be understated
by a factor of about (4.5), or about 20, for each
locus. For a three-locus genotype, the error may
thus be about 8,000-fold.
Id. (footnote omitted).
137. See generally Lander, supra note 27; New York State Report, supra note 57.
138. Lander, supra note 27, at 501 ("Few molecular geneticists, in such
circumstances, would declare a match without performing a mixing experiment....").
139. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 970, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994 ("The technique is simple
and scientifically accepted.").
140. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
141. See Memorandum, supra note 3, at 43.
142. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 87 (footnote omitted).
of both in a third lane so when the print is made," rather than relying
on the last step of comparison to determine a match, the mix serves as a
control. If the samples match, the bands on the print should appear
comigrated (on top of each other) so the laboratory knows that both the
sample and the suspect DNA ran the same and were not contaminated.
The problem is that although everyone agrees that the mixing
experiment is an essential control, none of the labs use the test. Nor do
either of the labs cite the mixing experiments in their protocols.1"
Indeed, all three labs have typically not used mixing experiments at
all.' 5
The Castro court also found that serial dilutions were an essential
control to ensure the accuracy of lane to lane comparisons.'" These
controls are not presently in effect in either of the laboratories. Basically,
all that is done is to run extra tests of different DNA concentrations so
that when you compare them you can observe the varying intensities of
the bands on the print.147 The problems with not using this control are
twofold. First, a thicker band will lead the scientist to falsely assume that
the two bands comigrated when they are in fact several alleles off.4 '
Second, because thicker bands exist, the ability to abide by the standard
deviation rules becomes skewed. 4 Obviously, when such numbers are
projected, any rational deliberation would render the data suspect. The
use of this evidence to possibly decide the fate of someone's life, without
this basic control, does not even begin to meet the rigors of our criminal
justice system.
The last contended control is that of the use of various
probes. 5  This is legally the most difficult aspect of the procedure
143. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 7.
145. Id.
146. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
147. Id. ("Where there is a high concentration of DNA when compared with
another sample it will result in much more intense bands thereby creating a large band
difficult to identify and measure.").
148. See generally Memorandum, supra note 3, at 48.
149. Lander, supra note 27, at 502 ("When a result is reported to have an error rate
of 1 in 100,000,000, it seems essential that the underlying data are not left as a matter
of subjective opinion.").
150. Two other areas of difficulties exist with the present technology of DNA
probes. See generally Lander, supra note 27. First, probes may either be synthetic or
non-synthetic. "A non-synthetic probe is created by the insertion of a piece of human
DNA into a bacterial vector where it grows, or clones, into a sample that can be used
1990] N0TES 207
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
because it tends to be the most scientific. Two factors must be brought
to light: First, accurate records must be kept of the actual probes used so
the nexus between their use and the results derived can be scrutinized on
cross-examination and by an independent scientist or committee; second,
due to the lack of universal scientific approval of the types of probes
needed for an accurate test,' the legal community must be wary to
accept the results without scrutinizing the methods employed to obtain
them. Of foremost importance is that "[t]he assumption that DNA
polymorphisms can distinguish among individuals is accepted, but it must
be shown that each polymorphic system performs as claimed by its
proponents. No consensus exists on which of the available systems is
optimal, or even whether all of the systems are reliable for forensic
purposes." 2 Thus, the probes used to detect these systems are still
suspect.
In the rare event that a mixing experiment could
not be carried out, most molecular geneticists would at
least insist on using internal controls - probes which
detect non-polymorphic DNA fragments within each lane
- to verify that the lanes have run at equal speeds and to
provide standards against which fragment sizes can be
measured precisely."'
for probe purposes." Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994. A synthetic
probe, however, is essentially manufactured by arranging base pairs into a desired
sequence. The important differences are again twofold: first, non-synthetic probes can
easily become contaminated in the bacterial DNA in which it grows, and second, a
danger is present if the contaminated non-synthetic probe is used on a contaminated
sample of human DNA because both bacterial and human DNA will register when the
print is made. Id.
Second, issues arise as to the use of either multi-locus or single-locus probes.
Lifecodes Corporation also uses what they call "cocktail" probes - which are a mixture
of single-locus probes. See generally Lifecodes, supra note 7. This, in essence, is the
difference between using a probe that recognizes a long allele system (a longer length
of a DNA strand) verses using a probe which recognizes a more discrete allele system
which may lower the variability in the population a little. See Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at
971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
151. See Memorandum, supra note 3, at 48. ("Although there is a consensus that
non-polymorphic probes are an essential scientific control, there is inadequate evidence
to conclude that they currently exist for forensic application.").
152. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 13-14.
153. Lander, supra note 27, at 501.
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Non-polymorphic probes essentially hybridize to specific alleles
which are present in most of the population. In other words, they will
hybridize to areas in the genome in which everybody's DNA is the
same. 14 Thus, although they are basically useless alone,155 they are
an essential control because they detect the same fragment in each sample
and, hence, indicate whether any band shift in the print is due to
contamination or degradation.'m However, the problem still exists that,
although this control is generally accepted within the scientific
community, "[t]here is absolutely no evidence in the record that anyone
has developed any, much less all the suitable non-polymorphic probes
essential to forensic DNA identification." 
157
Although the competing scientific labs use different
approaches, 5 ' there is little debate as to which is better as each has its
unique benefits. 159 The debate arises, however, during the process of
declaring the two prints match and applying the data therefrom to a
population database.
VII. POPULATION GENETICS
[I]t is [not] necessarily wrong to inform the jury of the
underlying statistical evidence but that there is a real
danger that the jury will 'use the evidence as a measure of
the probability of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and
154. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
155. Id. (" Mhey are of comparatively little use for forensic purposes because they
do not demonstrate differences between individuals.").
156. See Memorandum, supra note 3, at 50.
157. Id. After discussing the quality of the witnesses that had testified, the publicity
the case has generated, and the searing attack placed on Lifecodes methods, the defense
concluded: "It's a matter of common sense that if Lifecodes had developed or could
obtain from any other lab in the world the necessary non-polymorphic probes to defend
its conclusions, it certainly would have done so prior to the conclusion of this hearing."
Id. at 51 n.ll.
158. Lifecodes uses multi-locus probes. See Lifecodes, supra note 7. Cellmark
uses single-locus probes combined with multi-locus probes in forensics and multi-locus
probes in paternity. See Celbnark, supra note 7.
159. Multi-locus probes are more discriminatory in that they select allele
frequencies that are less common amongst different individuals. See generally Lifecodes,
supra note 7. Single locus probes, while selecting allele frequencies that occur more
often between different individuals, can discount some of the inherent complexities that
arise with degraded or contaminated DNA samples. See generally Celhnark, supra note
7.
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that the evidence will thereby undermine the presumption
of innocence, erode the values served by the reasonable
doubt standard, and dehumanize our system of
justice. 160
Once a laboratory has determined that a match exists between the
sample DNA and the suspect DNA, it must somehow give it legal
significance by estimating its frequency in the population. 6 ' This has
been an area of much debate and an area in which basic legal analysis has
trumped scientific theory.'1
Essentially, all that needs to be done is to take the bands on the
print, determine their uniqueness in the population and then make a
calculation of the odds that the specific combination of unique bands
would occur in the population. The need for this is for basic evidentiary
purposes. In order for the law to convict it must first establish the logical
probabilities that the evidence may implicate an innocent individual. This
is done by the product rule. "This rule holds that the probability that a
number of events, in this case matches, will occur simultaneously is
determined by multiplying the probabilities that each event will
occur.'' However, there are both scientific and theoretical obstacles
in this estimate. First, the scientific difficulty is that of determining that
160. State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. 1983) (discussing Tribe, Trial
by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329,
1355 (1971)).
161. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989) (upholding the introduction
of DNA evidence as to its evidentiary aspect under the Frye standard - but precluded the
admissibility of the statistical probability of population genetics).
162. Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, _, 565 N.E.2d 440,446 (1991).
Cumin is the first decision to wholly preclude admission of a match because of
population genetics. Id. at __, 565 N.E.2d at 442-43.
Based on the absence of the general
acceptance or inherent rationality of the process
by which Cellmark concluded that only one
person in 59,000,000 would have the same
alleles as were shown in the test it conducted, we
conclude that the admission in evidence of the
test results was prejudicial error.
Id.
163. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 81.
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one band is in fact independent of the others observed on the print.'"
In other words, if the laboratory is calculating the odds of a certain band's
frequency in the population and then planning on compounding that
frequency by the probabilities of the other band's frequencies, then the
laboratory must be certain that those frequencies are independent of each
other. Thus, if a probability is figured for many bands and their
probabilities are multiplied together, while in reality those bands will
always be present in that sequence, the results have been seriously skewed
beyond all proportions. "The use of the product rule is based, of course,
on the assumption that the alleles identified by the various probes are
independent of one another. For the probes currently used by Lifecodes
and Cellmark, this assumption is still controversial.""
Second, this scientific obstacle is made insurmountable by a
Pandora's Box of theoretical problems it expounds. To determine whether
certain probabilities exist in a society, the population must be in Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium. " As already seen, a genotype is a pair of
alleles, one is inherited from the mother, and the other from the
father.167 Thus, the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium suggests that after a
couple of generations of random intermarriage (reproduction) all genes
will be totally mixed - the frequencies (or odds) that a certain gene will
turn up in the population will be random." Having thus assumed that
our bands are independent of one another, one must further assume that
164. Id. at 82 ("To simply assume, without empirical verification, that distinct
alleles are independent could allow misleading statistical testimony which greatly
underestimates the probability of a coincidental match.").
165. Id. at 84-85 (emphasis added).
166. See Lander, supra note 27, at 504. "The classical test for Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium is based on Wahlund's principle that the rate of homozygosity in a
population containing distinct subgroups will be higher than would be expected under the
assumption of random mating." Id. (footnotes omitted).
167. See Memorandum, supra note 3, at 35.
168. Id. at 36
According to the Hardy Weinberg principle, in
a completely mixed population, the frequency of
homozygotes (an identical allele inherited from
both parents) will be p squared (where p is the
frequency of the one allele) and the frequency of
heterozygotes (different alleles inherited from the
mother than inherited from the father) will be 2
times pl times p2 (where pl and p2 are the
frequencies of the individual alleles).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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their independence exists at the same frequencies throughout the
population.
The basic problem arises that "[i]f. . . the population consisted
of heterogeneous subgroups (that is members of the subgroup tended to
mate within the subgroup), then the Hardy Weinberg Equation cannot be
used to calculate genotype frequencies in the broader population. The
reasoning is both simple and logical."" However, "[tihe possibility
that certain pairs of bands may cooccur [sic] at greater than the rate
expected under the assumption of random mating is apparently not one
that has been examined by research conducted to date by Cellmark and
Lifecodes. " "
Although not dealt with by the court, this was an issue in the
Castro hearing.' , The test used to determine whether a population
contains heterogenous subgroups, and thus deviates from Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium, is known as the Wahlund principle. "Under this test, the
observed number of homozygotes is compared to the expected number of
homozygotes for the entire population. If the observed number is much
greater than the expected number, a statistically significant deviation, then
scientists will reasonably conclude that the population is outside Hardy
Weinberg Equilibrium."" The defendant in Castro, in what the court
referred to as a "piercing attack,""7 3 denounced the lab's statements that
the Hispanic population data used in this case was in Hardy-Weinberg
equilibrium.'74 Indeed, the defense alleged, and the experts testified,
that:
169. Id.
170. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 85.
171. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 977, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 992 ("Since the court is
precluding the evidence of inclusion because of the unresolved ambiguities, any
population genetics question need not be resolved in detail by this court."). Similarly,
the court in United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990), declined to enter
the "Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium thicket" citing recent disagreement within the
scientific community as to the applicability of the test. Id. at 259-60 & n.20.
172. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 37.
173. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 974, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
174. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 41. The defense in Caldwell v. Georgia, 260
Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990), was unsuccessful in convincing the Supreme Court of
Georgia that the Lifecodes population data was not sufficient to meet its burden in
establishing that the relevant population was in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. The court,
however, permitted a projected claim by using a more conservative method. Id. at 301-
02, 393 S.E.2d at 443.
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Most significantly, Dr. Green testified that the methods
reflected in Lifecodes' matrices were so grossly
unacceptable, the only conceivable explanation was that
Lifecodes' initially calculated Hardy Weinberg the correct
way, got a result not to their liking, and then redefined
their bins to achieve the result they wanted (T. 4542).
This willful departure from accepted methods has
grievously misled the scientific community, and
represents nothing less than scientific fraud.75
Another factor necessary in evaluating the independence of bands
in DNA prints is determining whether the bands produced by each probe
are independent of those produced by other probes. 76 Thus, if you
have a freely mixing population where the segments of DNA selected by
the probes are random, a state of linkage equilibrium exists. In a
population containing heterogeneous subgroups, however, linkage
equilibrium is not expected and does not occur.'" The point of this
theory is that if a person is in a subgroup (a Puerto Rican in the Castro
case) then a band is common at one loci. It would also be more likely to
have that band at another loci - something not found in a freely mixing
population which the lab uses to predict their frequencies. Thus, the
defendant in the Castro case, using what he appropriately termed
"everyday observations,"' 78 rationally stated that the court could take
judicial notice that within the Hispanic population, Cubans are more likely
to mate with Cubans, Puerto Ricans with Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-
Americans with Mexican-Americans. The defendant further noted that the
rest of society was stratified by ethnic, religious, and socio-economic
subgroups.'"
Thus, it is apparent that, along with all the previous scientific
obstacles that still need to be surmounted with this new technology, the
present data being used is simply and unequivocally wrong."0 This
175. Memorandum supra note 3, at 38 (emphasis in original).
176. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 85.
177. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 40.
178. Id. at 41.
179. Id.
180. "At the present time there simply is no alternative method being written about
much less implemented by anyone in the scientific community." Id. at 42 (emphasis in
original). Lifecodes has changed their calculation technique since Castro: "Lifecodes
said its tests showed that the probability of someone other than [defendant] having the
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point is best expressed by the case of Texas v. Hicks.' In this case,
the defendant was being tried on a rape and murder charge. 82  The
frequencies of the match occurring in the population were reported to the
jury to be 1 in 96,000,000." "[Tihe population-genetic analysis took
no account of the fact that the crime occurred in a small, inbred Texas
town founded by a handful of families.""8 The man was convicted and
sentenced to death."l
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL DIFFICULTIES
Although focus has been concentrated on the problems and lack
of a universal scientific consensus of the general theories and processes
involved in DNA Profiles, terse mention will be called to some of the
more concrete difficulties that exist in the actual laboratory environment.
"While most of these problems would cause the tests to produce
uninterpretable results, or at worse, to falsely exculpate a guilty suspect,
some problems might even cause false incrimination of an innocent
suspect."'" Note should be made that these difficulties don't just add
to the inherent flaws in the "facts" of 1 in 30 billion, they multiply and
same genetic fingerprint were about one in five billion. But by November [1989], when
she completed her final report, they had revised their calculations to come up with the
1 in 707 million figure." Lyall, DNA Tests Link Golub to Killing, Expert Says, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1990, at B4, col. 5.
181. Texas v. Hicks, No. 88-134-CR (Tex. Crim. Ct. 1989) (currently pending
briefs for appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals); see also Lander, supra note
27, at 505.
182. Hicks, No. 88-134-CR.
183. Id.
184. Lander, supra note 27, at 505. The prosecutor in the case, Robert W. Gage,
County-District Attorney of Freestone County, Tex., violently opposes Dr. Lander's
characterization of this case. Specifically, Mr. Gage contends that there is a lack a data
to verify any intermarriage, and that the community is not isolated - only rural. Mr.
Gage points to the seemingly overwhelming evidence against the defendant and claims
that "it is my belief that a conviction could have been obtained if the statistical
probability of a match would have been I in 100 or possibly even less. The 1 in
96,000,000 figure was simply unnecessary." Letter from Robert W. Gage, Esq., to
Peter G. Brown (Mar. 21, 1990) (as sent to the Author from Mr. Gage). That is not,
however, the data that was used.
185. Lander, supra note 27, at 505.
186. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 92 (footnote omitted). "Although the
likelihood of any of these events seems low, the possibility of their occurrence cannot
be excluded by validation studies published to date." Id. at 92 n.207.
NOTES
compound them.
William C. Thompson and Simon Ford have once again been the
authority in explaining the scientific problems that arise in the laboratory
which lead tests to yield artefactual results.1 As we have seen, these
problems exist largely because of unique difficulties surrounding the
forensic use of DNA Profiles as opposed to the clinical use of the
technique. 8 The following list of possible causes of an artifactual
result being produced by a laboratory are a brief summary of those set
forth by William C. Thompson and Simon Ford.
Problems may arise in the digestion phase. Possibilities exist that
the DNA will be only partially digested by the restriction enzyme, thereby
causing fragments that are too long, or the DNA may be cut at the wrong
sites by the restriction enzyme, thus causing fragments that are too short.
The latter problem is referred to as "star activity" and it arises when
contaminants or laboratory errors affect the activity of the restriction
enzyme. 1" These problems must be added to the possibility that the
scientist either uses the incorrect enzyme, or one that has been
contaminated.
The Profiles may also go awry at other points along the
continuum. For example, problems may occur at the Southern Blotting
stage that "may cause certain bands to disappear, creating a different,
misleading pattern.""19  Problems may also arise under the gel
electrophoresis stage since the various samples (suspect and evidentiary)
are placed in adjoining wells on the gel. Because of the complexity
(tediousness may be more appropriate) of this stage, the danger is always
present that some of the sample will become accidentally mixed with
another. Difficulties are present in the hybridization stage as well. As
discussed, a high proportion of DNA sequences are identical from person
to person. "If the probe identifies one of these common sequences, rather
than a polymorphic sequence, the resulting DNA prints will match
whether or not the samples have a common source.""
Regardless of the current reliability of the procedures, the main
concern is that the conditions under which present laboratory work is done
187. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 92-96.
188. See supra notes 4, 83-151 and accompanying text.
189. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 92-96.
190. Id. at 94.
191. id. (footnote omitted).
192. Id. at 95. "If the analyst mistakenly uses the wrong probe, a similar problem
could arise." Id. at 95 n.224.
19901
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are simply deplorable. This state of affairs has caused one expert to
comment that "[a]t present, forensic science is virtually unregulated - with
the paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher standards
to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to put
a defendant on death row." 1" In fact, there is no quality control, no
proficiency testing, and no licensing."
IX. BEYOND ACCURACY - LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
This note will proceed to outline a few of the various concerns
(other than basic accuracy) presented by the use of DNA Profiles. These
concerns stem from three inherent aspects of DNA Profiling. First, an
adequate sample must be saved and preserved for the DNA laboratory to
analyze. Second, even if an adequate sample of DNA is located at a
crime scene and a Profile is accurately rendered, it is useless without a
suspect with which to compare. This means law enforcement officials
must resort to age old methods of attempting to ascertain "who done it,"
unless the government maintains DNA Profiles in a data base, much like
fingerprints. These databases are an impending reality in an age of
computers because the "bar code" appearance of DNA Profiles make them
easily symbolized. More significantly, because of these symbols the DNA
Profiles are effortlessly searchable on a computer. 195
The third aspect is that civil libertarians object to the use of DNA
Profiles for a host of reasons. Some of these reasons relate back to
timeless concerns of invasions of privacy1" and legality of evidence;
however, one unique concern is the fact that DNA contains much more
"information" than traditional scientific tests. While various scientific
tests to date have different levels of probative value as to whether the
suspect or defendant was at the scene of the crime, or the mate in
paternity, DNA Profiles contain the genetic make-up of an individual.
Thus, "DNA can tell the knowledgeable examiner anything that can be
read from an individual's genes, including familial relationships and
193. Williams, supra note 60, at 30 (quoting Dr. Eric S. Lander, a scientist at the
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research in Cambridge, Mass.).
194. Id.
195. Note, DNA Typing: A New Investigatory Tool, 1989 DUKE L.J. 474, 481.
196. See State v. Biddings, 49 Ohio App. 3d 83, 550 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988) (where defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, appealed a trial court's order to submit
for DNA testing because it infringed his individual freedom to practice his religion as
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution).
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predisposition to certain diseases.""
Professor E. Donald Shapiro of New York Law School has
expounded concern about the problem of "Big Brother" maintaining these
files.'" Professor Shapiro's main concern'99 is that, as the
government's databanks proliferate, so will their compromise by non-
governmental entities." Professor Shapiro likens this potential abuse
to past instances of improper use of income tax returns and the FBI's
fingerprint system by those other than the federal government."' He
suggests that, if the databank gets compromised as others have been in the
past, employers could refuse to hire people that have genetic weaknesses
and the health insurance industry would simply refuse to insure those who
were not genetically suitable.'
Various other authorities have made vocal their concerns over the
data banking of DNA Profiles. These databanks, however, have already
been implemented by a variety of states.' Generally, they call for the
submission of DNA samples by convicted persons of specified crimes.
The statutes usually also devise a system of access so as to prohibit
197. DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 678. "There are over 4000 known single-
gene hereditary illnesses. Gene mapping projects now underway ultimately could make
it possible to diagnose all of them from examination of the genome." Id. at 678 n.67
(citing Coles, The Pros and Cons of Freedom of Access to Human Genome Data, 333
NATuRE 692 (1988)); see also H. BuTZEL, GENETICS IN THE COURTS 722-25 (1987).
198. For an analysis of DNA as an Orwellian nightmare, see The Dark Side, supra
note 15 (citing G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949)).
199. Address by Professor E. Donald Shapiro of New York Law School, New York
Law School Panel Discussion on the Constitutionality of DNA Fingerprinting and
Testing (Nov. 15, 1989) (sponsored by the Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity of New York
Law School). Professor Shapiro is also concerned about the fact that most people equate
a DNA Profile match with guilt. The Professor believes that this is inappropriate - the
only evidentiary function a match can serve, assuming it is correct, is to identify the
individual as having been at a certain place. It does not, Shapiro contends, mean that
he committed any crime. This view, although very cogent, becomes a little tenuous
when the sample is blood or semen. There is, however, much credibility to the
perception that it is still only an identification test and the State must still prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that it is the defendant that actually committed the crime. Id.
200. Nightline: DNA Fingerprinting (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1989).
201. id. at 5.
202. Id. at 6.
203. Such as the system in place in the state of Colorado. Id. at 5 (statement of
Professor E. Donald Shapiro, New York Law School) ("[A]lready we have in Colorado
[a rule] requiring all sex offenders to be genetically data banked or leave their
fingerprints in a data bank.").
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unauthorized use. Concerns have been raised, however, over these
databases.
Genetic information, if not scrupulously secured, could
conceivably be used to read an enormous array of
information from a person's genes, information that
people have a right to believe will remain confidential.
For instance, employers, insurers and other non-law
enforcement personnel could use information on familial
relationships, genetic predispositions to certain diseases,
or genetic deficiencies that perhaps indicate a propensity
toward violent or antisocial behavior.'
The American Civil Liberties Union in Washington has also expressed
these concerns: "Unique and serious civil liberties concerns are raised
when the involuntary extraction and/or analysis of DNA is proposed to
create a data bank, or 'library' of information, for the purpose of
identifying and investigating individuals as potential criminal
suspects."' 5  More specifically, criminal defendants have argued that
submission to police control for the purpose of obtaining evidence for
scientific analysis violates: (1) the privilege against self-incrimination; (2)
the right to counsel; (3) the right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizures; and (4) due process." These concerns are topics unto
themselves, " however, without the presence of a clear abuse of these
rights, the courts are unlikely to greet the implication of them with
warmth due to the great potential of DNA Profiles as a law enforcement
tool. The desire to obtain evidence increases when the possibility exists
that the tissue sample taken from the suspect could positively identify the
suspect as the guilty party. 8  As long as the authorities strictly
followed the basic protections for obtaining other scientific evidence, i.e.
a warrant based on probable cause,' any attack of DNA admissibility
would more appropriately rest within the procedures themselves.
204. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 33-34.
205. DNA Extraction and Analysis in the Criminal Context, The American Civil
Liberties Union - Washington, Board of Directors (adopted Feb. 25, 1989).
206. P. GIANELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE 50 (1986).
207. See generally id. at 3-8.
208. The Dark Side, supra note 15, at 528.
209. See id. (citing the "reasonable expectation of privacy" as defined in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
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Of further significance is the probative value of the fact that a
forensic sample left at the scene of a crime matches a Profile from the
database. To further explain, an illustration will be put forth in brief as
derived from William C. Thompson and Simon Ford.210 The scenario
goes as follows: a crime is committed, an adequate Profile is made, it is
entered into a database and a good match is found. Suppose further that
circumstantial evidence also exists such as the matched person lives near
the scene of the crime and that the person has a history of similar criminal
activity. The authors have explained the relevance of the DNA Profile in
such a case by applying Bayes's theorem:
[E]vidence is probative to the extent it is more likely to
exist if the defendant is guilty than if he is innocent. In
this case a match between the suspect and perpetrator is
nearly certain if the suspect is in fact guilty. But a match
between the suspect and perpetrator is also certain if he
is not guilty, because he was chosen based on the fact he
matches. Hence, a Bayesian analysis suggests that this
evidence has no probative value.2 '
Although somewhat divorced from the significance of a DNA match
(assuming of course both the initial test and the sample were tested
correctly with all the procedural safeguards in place), the Bayes' theorem
logically brings us full circle to our original concern over the effect a
claimed match has on a jury.
Two major problems face the ability of both the State and
defendants from utilizing DNA Profiles to their fullest extent. First, as
collection and preservation of DNA Profiles involves contact with genetic
material, people have a legitimate fear of contracting AIDS. A rape or
210. Thompson & Ford, supra note 14, at 100-01.
211. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
By this analysis, the probative value of a piece of
evidence E, for proving a suspect guilty, G or
not guilty, NG depends on the value of the so-
called likelihood ratio, p(E/G)/p(E/NG), which
measures the relative likelihood of E given G
and given NG. If the likelihood ratio is one -
that is, if the evidence is as likely to exist if the
suspect is innocent as if he is guilty, the evidence
has no probative value.
Id. at 101 n.248 (citation omitted).
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sodomy victim, for example, would go straight to a hospital where she,
or he, would immediately be cleaned of blood and semen that could
spread the HIV virus. This will leave prosecutors no material to test in
order to prove whether the accused is guilty, and would also leave one
falsely accused no scientific basis to contest the victim's accusation.212
Care must also be taken to preserve clothing when genetic
material has been spread onto it. In an incident occurring in Chicago this
fortunately was not a problem.213 Gary Dotson was sent to prison in
1979 for the rape of Cathleen Crowell Webb but his sentence was
commuted (the governor refused to pardon) when his alleged victim
recanted her story years later.21 4 Because of an unrelated incident, Mr.
Dotson was sent back to prison.215 In 1988, DNA evidence, having
been preserved from Ms. Webb's underwear, was sent to a DNA
laboratory which determined that Mr. Dotson could not have been
responsible. 2" He was granted a new trial and the state declined to
prosecute.217
Adequate preservation of DNA material is an example of the
second type of problem that faces the use of DNA Profiling. This
problem stems from the recent Supreme Court decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood.2"' In Youngblood, a ten year old boy was abducted from
a carnival, molested, and repeatedly sodomized. 2 '9 After his assailant
returned him to the carnival, he was taken to a hospital where he was
treated with a standard sexual assault kit.' The results of the kit were
placed in the police department refrigerator, but the clothing was neither
refrigerated nor frozen."' Later testing by police criminologists failed
to yield any conclusive results, due to the inadequate preservation and
212. Williams, supra note 60, at 30-31. "In the publication AIDS Alert, FBI
director John Hicks recommends that rape victims be swabbed with a sterile tissue before
being cleaned with any other cleanser, in order to preserve possible DNA evidence."
Id. at 31.






218. 488 U.S. 51 (1988), rehg denied, 488 U.S. 1051 (1989).
219. Id. at 52.
220. Id. at 52-53.
221. Id. at 53.
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subsequent degradation of the clothing and samples.'m
The Arizona Court of Appeals disallowed the evidence citing the
sample's degradation as the reason.' The Arizona court held that
when identity is an issue at trial and police permit the destruction of
evidence that could eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator, such
evidence is material to the defense and its loss is a denial of due
process.' The United States Supreme Court reversed.' In an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist the Court held: "[T]he Due Process
Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the
State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than
that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have
exonerated the defendant."I Thus, the Court concluded that the
defendant needed to show "bad faith" on the part of the police in their
failure to preserve the evidence. 27 This is clearly an inappropriate
standard when the future potential of DNA testing as forensic evidence is
considered. A cogent dissent written by Justice Blackmun and joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall commented that:
As technology develops, the potential for this type of
evidence to provide conclusive results on any number of
questions will increase. Current genetic testing
measures, frequently used in civil paternity suits, are
extraordinarily precise . . . . The importance of these
types of evidence is indisputable, and requiring police to
recognize their importance is not unreasonable. '
It is frightfully clear that once DNA Profiling technology becomes reliable
and verifiable, Youngblood will be overruled and law enforcement
agencies will be mandated to preserve forensic evidence.
222. Id. at 54; see also Williams, supra note 60, at 31.
223. State v. Youngblood, 154 Ariz. 50, 54, 734 P.2d 592, 596 (1986).
224. Id.
225. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59.
226. Id. at 57.
227. See generally Annotation, Right of Accused in State Courts to Have Expert
Inspect, Examine, or Test Physical Evidence in Possession of Prosecution--Modern
Cases, 27 A.L.R. 4th 1188 (1984).
228. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Williams, supra note 60, at 31.
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An additional concern that the courts have generally avoided is to
what extent should an individual have a right to a DNA test.' As
knowledge of these tests spread, courts will be confronted with many
questions of this nature. 30 Other serious concerns are selection of the
laboratory to do the testing and also who is going to be able to oversee
the procedures. The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Schwart 1
stated that "fair trial and due process rights are implicated when data
relied upon by a laboratory in performing tests [sought to be admitted at
trial] are not available to the opposing party for review and cross
examination."2 The practical problem, however, is that the amount of
the sample is usually too inadequate in the first place to allow retesting by
the defendant's experts. Until procedures are established for appropriate
independent review, the defense will inappropriately only be able review
the results of the tests.
X. SAFEGUARDS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED FOR DNA PROFILES
Presently, technology just does not exist that allows a scientist to
enter a courtroom, cloaked in the rubric of "science," and proclaim that
the odds that the defendant does not match the forensic sample are one in
30 billion. 3 It is these questions that prompted New York State to call
for the implementation of safeguards.' In calling for a statewide DNA
229. DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 676-77. The author, Anthony Pearsall,
suggests that read together, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1975) and Little v. Streater,
452 U.S. 1 (1981), provide a constitutional right to free DNA testing by a neutral (non-
governmental) laboratory for the indigent defendant. DNA Printing, supra note 56, at
677.
230. See Dabbs v. Vergari, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29, 1990, at 30, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(the court gave a man convicted of rape six years ago the right to have the victim's
panties and other evidence retested); see also In re the Paternity of J.L.K., 151 Wis. 2d
566, 568, 445 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1989) (defendant in a paternity action demanded that
DNA Profiles be taken, then objected to their admission when the results went against
his claims).
231. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
232. Id. at 427.
233. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 13 ("While the scientific principles
and practices underlying DNA typing are generally accepted in the scientific community,
there are serious questions with forensic DNA testing as it is currently being
practiced.").
234. See generally The Dark Side, supra note 15, at 479.
Specifically, before results of the DNA
typing technique can be accepted as scientifically
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network, New York emphasized the need for coordinated quality
assurance, quality control, an accreditation process to monitor public and
private laboratories, an Advisory Committee (from the law enforcement,
scientific, legal, and judicial communities) to oversee the network, and a
Scientific Review Board to assist in evaluating the tests in specific
cases.
23 5
The Castro decision made it clear that private labs, or even the
FBI, should not be allowed to make these absurd claims of accuracy,
while not allowing the public, or the scientific community, to review their
methods. The reality is that there is little knowledge as to what actually
is taking place within the labs because "[p]rivate laboratories are reluctant
to share information about their procedures, and they have generally
adopted- a proprietary stance and treated their protocols as trade
secrets."' Indeed, facing a court order to produce the documentation
of a certain DNA Profile, the FBI chose to withdraw the evidence rather
than have its methods scrutinized in court. 37 "It is difficult to reconcile
the practice of cloaking a methodology in secrecy with the claim that the
methodology is widely accepted. Until private laboratories allow their
procedures to be reviewed by the general scientific community, it will
reliable in forensics, the following controls and
standards must be developed: 1) controls to
ensure the accurate interpretation of results; 2)
standards for declaring matches; 3) standards for
the choice and number of polymorphic sites
studied; 4) standards for determining the
probability of a coincidental match and for
determining the relevant population studies; 5)
standards for record keeping; and 6) standards
for proficiency testing and licensing.
Id.
235. New York State Report, supra note 57, at ii-iii.
236. Id. at 27 ("At one laboratory, scientists who take the technology transfer
training course and the litigants who oppose the admission of DNA typing evidence have
been required to sign agreements not to disclose the methods and procedures used by the
private laboratory."). The various laboratories involved have admitted that their chief
goal in the industry is not to perform the test - it is to market the probes when the tests
become accepted. The industry is earning $40 million a year. The Dark Side, supra
note 15, at 500.
237. Arizona v. Kiles, No. CR15444/15577 (Yuma Cty. Sup. Ct., Ariz. June 26,
1989). The court ordered the FBI to release lab notes and records - the FBI withdrew
the evidence. DNA advocates say the case did not need the additional evidence and the
withdrawal was to save time and money - those who oppose the present use of DNA in
the courts claim this was simply because the FBI could not substantiate its results.
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remain impossible to evaluate their merits."" 8
The Report of New York State Forensic DNA Analysis Panel has
done a commendable job in outlining the necessary safeguards to prevent
abuses from the eventual databanking of DNA Profiles. Foremost of
these is the recommendation that: "Use of a databank for other than law
enforcement suspect identification purposes should be expressly prohibited
and subject the abuser to criminal penalties."' The Panel also
suggested that only the identification data obtained from the Profile be
computerized and not the Profile itself.' Further, the entire DNA
sample itself should not be saved to safeguard against any further invasion
of rights.
The New York Panel also outlined some very essential proposals.
Qf these are the need to develop a New York database for population
genetic comparisons.21 This will ensure a more accurate determination
of frequencies of alleles in the population. Also, the Panel calls for
national standardization of databank procedures so that they will serve as
a check on quality control and provide for interstate criminal
searches. 2
The bottom line is that all these proposals will be ineffective
unless a system of continuing proficiency testing is implemented to insure
accuracy, qualifications, and consistency.' "Recently the Orange
238. New York State Report, supra note 57, at 27.
239. Id. at 34.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 31-36.
242. Id. at 37. An excellent suggestion, albeit impracticable in light of the fact that
the technology is changing daily and what is state of the art today is outdated tomorrow.
243. New York State's Legislature passed a bill (A-1 1073) that attempted to impose
uniform scientific standards for laboratories that perform genetic profiling and require
licensing for these labs. Slackman, Genetic Finger-Pointing, Long Island Newsday, July
7, 1990, at 3, col. 1. To produce admissible Profiles under the bill the laboratories
performing the tests would have to be licensed by the state Health Department. Id. If
it had been signed by the governor, the law would have gone into effect on July 1, 1991.
Id. The bill was recalled by its sponsor Assemblyman Terrance Zaleski and was
amended and reintroduced as Bill 807, Regulating Forensic DNA Laboratories.
Telephone Interview with Lucille Laberbera, Executive Assistant to Assemblyman
Zaleski (Feb. 4, 1991). If passed and signed into law the bill will go into affect on
January 7, 1992. Id. Under the current provisions of the bill, to produce admissible
quality DNA Profiles the lab performing the test will have to be licensed by the
Department of Health and the Division of Criminal Justice. Slackman, supra, at 3, col.
1. The bill also creates a five-member review board of scientists responsible for
establishing minimum standards for carrying out tests and analyzing the results. Id.
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County sheriff's department crime laboratory sent about 50 blood and
semen samples drawn from about 20 people to each of the three labs and
asked them to determine which specimens came from the same
people."'" Knowing that their results were going to be scrutinized,
while also being cautious not to make conclusions about some of the
samples at all, "[olne company was wrong in one of the forty-four
matches it identified, another was wrong in one of fifty matches, and only
the third company was correct in all of its matches."' Moreover,
officials from the laboratories that erred blamed their mistakes on sloppy
lab work - not on technique.' " Thus, we have seen that the accuracy
of the procedures are laden with conceptual uncertainties - and that the
techniques are pervaded with subjective determinations and plain error.
Without a scientific analysis, it is fair to take notice that 1 in 50 and 1 in
44 does not equal 1 in 30 billion.
XI. CONCLUSION
DNA Profiles, as this Note has demonstrated, involve an
extraordinary array of scientific and legal implications. They will, in the
future, dramatically alter many aspects of the law. They will be a
phenomenal step forward for law enforcement, our criminal justice
system, and many areas of civil adjudication; but science, as well as the
court, is not ready. Time is needed for science, the courts, and the
government to work out the difficulties required to set up a viable process
for managing this new technology.
The technology is not ready. The bar must wait.
Michael J. DiRusso
244. Thompson, supra note 5, at 14. A comparable study of forensic laboratory
performance was done with electrophoresis testing to determine genetic markers in
physiological stains - a similar forensic test in its operational difficulties. The
laboratories were only sent pure, fresh samples with no contamination. "Of the sixty-
eight laboratories that returned results, sixteen (23.5%) were in error on one or both
samples." DNA Printing, supra note 56, at 673 (footnote omitted). "In a three-year
study funded by the Justice Department, forensic laboratories received identical dried
blood stains; 71.2 percent of the 128 labs participating in the study either mistyped the
sample or reported inconclusive results." The Dark Side, supra note 15, at 493 (footnote
omitted).
245. The New York Report, supra note 57, at 28.
246. Thompson, supra note 5, at 14.
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